Abstract. We consider N -player and mean field games in continuous time over a finite horizon, where the position of each agent belongs to {−1, 1}. If there is uniqueness of mean field game solutions, e.g. under monotonicity assumptions, then the master equation possesses a smooth solution which can be used to prove convergence of the value functions and of the feedback Nash equilibria of the N -player game, as well as a propagation of chaos property for the associated optimal trajectories. We study here an example with anti-monotonous costs, and show that the mean field game has exactly three solutions. We prove that the value functions converge to the entropy solution of the master equation, which in this case can be written as a scalar conservation law in one space dimension, and that the optimal trajectories admit a limit: they select one mean field game soution, so there is propagation of chaos. Moreover, viewing the mean field game system as the necessary conditions for optimality of a deterministic control problem, we show that the N -player game selects the optimum of this problem.
Introduction
In this paper, we study a simple yet illustrative example concerning the convergence problem in finite horizon mean field games. Mean field games, as introduced by J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions and, independently, by M. Huang, R.P. Malhamé and P.E. Caines (cf. [25, 22] ), are limit models for symmetric non-cooperative many player dynamic games as the number of players tends to infinity; see, for instance, the lecture notes [5] and the recent two-volume work [8] . The notion of optimality adopted for the many player games is usually that of a Nash equilibrium. The limit relation can then be made rigorous in two opposite directions: either by showing that a solution of the limit model (the mean field game) induces a sequence of approximate Nash equilibria for the N -player games with approximation error tending to zero as N → ∞, or by identifying the possible limit points of sequences of N -player Nash equilibria, again in the limit as N → ∞, as solutions, in some sense, of the limit model. This latter direction constitutes the convergence problem in mean field games.
Important for the convergence problem is the choice of admissible strategies and the resulting definition of Nash equilibrium in the many player games. For Nash equilibria defined in stochastic open-loop strategies, the convergence problem is rather well understood, see [17] and, especially, [23] , both in the context of finite horizon games with general Brownian dynamics. In [23] , limit points of sequences of N -player Nash equilibria arguments from [11] based on the fact that the entropy solution is smooth away from its discontinuity, as well as a qualitative property of the N -player Nash equilibria, which prevents crossing of the discontinuity. The entropy solution property is actually not used in the proof. In Subsection 3.6, we give an alternative characterization of the solution selected by the Nash equilibria in terms of a variational problem based on the potential game structure of our example. Potential mean field games have been studied in several works in the continuous state setting, starting from [6] by Cardaliaguet, Graber, Porretta and Tonon.
Let us mention three recent preprints that are related to our paper. In [26] , Nutz, San Martin, and Tan address the convergence problem for a class of mean field games of optimal stopping. The limit model there possesses multiple solutions, which are grouped into three classes according to a qualitative criterion characterizing the proportion of players that have stopped at any given time. Solutions in one of the three classes will always arise as limit points of N -player Nash equilibria, solutions in the second class may be selected in the limit, while solutions in the third class cannot be reached through N -player Nash equilibria. In [24] , Lacker attacks the convergence problem in Markov feedback strategies by probabilistic methods. For a class of games with non-degenerate Brownian dynamics that may exhibit non-uniqueness, the author shows that all limit points of the N -player feedback Nash equilibria are concentrated, as in the open-loop case, on weak solutions of the mean field game. These solutions are more general than randomizations of ordinary ("strong") solutions of the mean field game; their flows of measures, in particular, are allowed to be stochastic containing additional randomness. Still, uniqueness in ordinary solutions implies uniqueness in weak solutions, which permits to partially recover the results in [7] . The question of which weak solutions can appear as limits of feedback Nash equilibria in a situation of non-uniqueness seems to be mainly open. In [16] , Delarue and Foguen Tchuendom study a class of linear-quadratic mean field games with multiple solutions in the diffusion setting. They prove that by adding a common noise to the limit dynamics uniqueness of solutions is re-established. As a converse to this regularization by noise result, they identify the mean field game solutions that are selected when the common noise tends to zero as those induced by the (unique weak) entropy solution of the master equation of the original problem. The interpretation of the master equation as a scalar conservation law works in their case thanks to a one-dimensional parametrization of an a priori infinite dimensional problem. Limit points of N -player Nash equlibria are also considered in [16] , but in stochastic open-loop strategies. Again, the mean field game solutions that are selected are those induced by the entropy solution of the master equation. Interestingly, these solutions are not minimal cost solutions; indeed, the solution which minimizes the cost of the representative player in the mean field game is shown to be different from the ones selected by the limit of the Nash equilibria. In [16] , the N -player limit and the vanishing common noise limit both select two solutions of the original mean field game with equal probability. This is due to the fact that in [16] the initial distribution for the state trajectories is chosen to sit at the discontinuity of the unique entropy solution of the master equation. In our case, we expect to see the same behavior if we started at the discontinuity, see Section 4 below.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, for a class of mean field and N -player games with finite state space, we give the definition of N -player Nash equilibrium and solution of the mean field game, and introduce the corresponding differential equations, namely the N -player Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system, the mean field game system as well as the associated master equation. Section 3 presents the two-state example, starting from the limit model, analyzed first in terms of the mean field game system (Subsection 3.1), then in terms of its master equation (Subsection 3.2). In Subsections 3.4 and 3.5 we show that the N -player Nash equilibria converge to the unique entropy solution of the master equation; cf. Theorems 8 and 11 below for convergence of value functions and propagation of chaos, respectively. The qualitative property of the Nash equilibria used in the proofs of convergence is in Subsection 3.3. Subsection 3.6 gives the variational characterization of the solution that is selected by the Nash equilibria. Concluding remarks are in Section 4.
2. Mean field games with finite state space 2.1. The N -player game. We consider the continuous time evolution of the states X i (t), i = 1, 2, . . . , N , of N players; the state of each player belongs to a given finite set Σ. Players are allowed to control, via an arbitrary feedback, their jump rates. For i = 1, 2, . . . , N and y ∈ Σ, we denote by α i y : [0, T ] × Σ N → [0, +∞) the rate at which player i jumps to the state y ∈ Σ: it is allowed to depend on the time t ∈ [0, T ], and on the state x = (x i ) N i=1 of all players. Denoting by A the set of functions [0, T ] × Σ N → [0, +∞) which are measurable and locally integrable in time, we assume α i y ∈ A. So we write α i ∈ A := A Σ , and let α N ∈ A N denote the controls of all players, and will be also called strategy vector. In more rigorous terms, for α N ∈ A N , the state evolution
is a Markov process, whose law is uniquely determined as solution to the martingale problem for the time-dependent generator
where
be the simplex of probability measures on Σ. To every x ∈ Σ N we associate the elements of P (Σ)
Thus, m N X (t) := m N Xt is the empirical measure of the system of the N players and m
Xt is the empirical measure of all the players except the i-th. Given the functions
the feedback controls α N ∈ A N and the corresponding process X(·), the cost associated to the i-th player is given by 
The search for a Nash equilibrium is based on the Hamilton-Jacobi equations that we now briefly illustrate. Define the Hamiltonian H : Σ × R Σ → R as the Legendre transform of L:
with (a · p) x := y =x a y p y . We will assume the supremum in (2) is attained at an unique maximizer a * (x, p). Given a function g : Σ → R, we denote its first finite difference ∆g(x) ∈ R Σ by
When we have a function g : Σ N → R, we denote with ∆ j g(x) ∈ R Σ the first finite difference with respect to the j-th coordinate. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system associated to the above differential game is given by:
This is a system of N |Σ| N coupled ODE's, indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , N } and x ∈ Σ N , whose well-posedness for all T > 0 can be proved through standard ODEs techniques under regularity assumptions which guarantee that a * and H are uniformly Lipschitz in their second variable. Under these conditions, the N -player game has a unique Nash equilibrium given by the feedback strategy α N ∈ A N defined by
2.2. The macroscopic limit: the mean field game and the master equation.
The limit as N → +∞ of the N -player game admits two alternative descriptions, that we illustrate here at heuristic level. Assuming the empirical measure of the process corresponding to the Nash equilibrium obeys a Law of Large Numbers, i.e. it converges to a deterministic flow in P (Σ), a representative player in the limit as N → +∞ faces the following problem:
(i) the player controls its jump intensities α y : [0, T ] × Σ → [0, +∞), y ∈ Σ, via feedback controls depending on time and on his/her own state; (ii) For a given deterministic flow of probability measures m : [0, T ] → P (Σ), the player aims at minimizing the cost
(iii) Denote by α * ,m the optimal control for the above problem, and let (X * ,m (t)) t∈ [0,T ] be the corresponding optimal process. The above-mentioned Law of Large Number predicts that the flow (m(t)) t∈[0,T ] should be chosen so that the following consistency relation holds:
This is implemented by coupling the HJB equation for the control problem with cost (4) with the forward Kolmogorov equation for the evolution of the Law(X * ,m (t)), obtaining the so-called Mean Field Game System:
It is known, and largely exemplified in this paper, that well-posedness of (3) does not imply uniqueness of solution to (MFG).
An alternative description of the macroscopic limit stems form the ansatz that the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system (3) is of the form
we formally obtain that U solves the following equation, that will be referred to as the master equation:
where the derivative
We conclude this section by recalling that uniqueness in both (MFG) and (MAS) is guaranteed if the cost function F and G are monotone in the Lasry-Lions sense, i.e. for every m, m ′ ∈ P (Σ),
and the same for G. We are interested here in examples that violate this monotonicity condition.
An example of non uniqueness
We consider now a special example within the class of models described above. We let Σ := {−1, 1} be the state space. An element m ∈ P (Σ) can be identified with its mean m(1) − m(−1); so from now we set m ∈ [−1, 1]. We also write α i (t, x) for α i −x i (t, x), i.e. the rate at which player i flips its state from
The final cost favors alignment with the majority, while the running cost is a simple quadratic cost. Compared to condition (5), note that the final cost is anti-monotonic, as
The associated Hamiltonian is given by
with a * (x, p) = p − x , where p − denotes the negative part of p. From now on, we identify p with p −x ∈ R and ∆ x u with its non-zero component u(−x) − u(x).
The mean field game system. The first equation in (MFG), i.e the HJB equation for the value function u(t, x), reads
This equation must be coupled with the forward Kolmogorov equation, that readsṁ = −m|z| + z. The mean field game system takes therefore the form:
(ii) three distinct solutions for T > 1/2: the constant zero solution, (z + , m + ), and
Proof. Note that (6) can be solved as a final value problem, giving
This can then be inserted in the forward Kolmogorov equation, giving
These are actually solutions of (7) if and only if the consistency relation obtained by setting t = T in (10) 
Moreover, distinct solutions of (11) correspond to distinct solutions of (7). We first look for nonnegative solutions of (11) . Set 
we see that those three alternatives occur if T < T (m 0 ), T = T (m 0 ) and T > T (m 0 ) respectively. The case M ≤ 0 is treated similarly.
The Master Equation.
Identifying again a probability on Σ with its mean m, the Master Equation (MAS) takes the form
, we easily derive a closed equation for Z:
Note that this equation has the form of a scalar conservation law
Scalar conservation laws typically possess unique smooth solutions for small time, but develop singularities in finite time: weak solutions exist but uniqueness may fail. To recover uniqueness the notion of entropy solution is introduced. A simple sufficient condition can be given for piecewise smooth functions (see [12] ). 
Z(t, m),
we have that, for every t ≥ 0 and every c strictly between Z − (t) and Z + (t),
Then, Z is the unique entropy solution of (14) .
Condition (15) 
For equation (13) , the entropy solution can be explicitly found. Let such function has a unique discontinuity in m = 0, for T > 1/2, and is C 1 outside.
Theorem 4.
The function Z defined in (19) is the unique entropy admissible weak solution to (13) .
Proof. From the properties of g(M, t, m), it follows that
for any time. These limits correspond to the solutions m + and m − of Proposition 2, evaluated at the terminal time. Therefore (17) is satisfied. We remark that the conservation law is set in the domain [−1, 1] without any boundary condition, but this is not a problem as we have invariance of the domain under the action of the characteristics.
Remark 5.
We observe that to the entropy solution (19) of (13) there corresponds a unique solution of (12) . Indeed, once Z is known, (12) becomes linear and it is well posed.
It is known that, if there were a regular solution to the master equation (13), thus Lipschitz in m, then this solution would provide a unique solution to the mean field game system (7), since the KFP equation would be well posed for any initial condition, when using z(t) = Z(T − t, m(t)) induced by the solution to the master equation: . In what follows, we use N rather than N + 1 as apex in all objects related to the N + 1-player game. By symmetry again, the value function v N,0 (t, x) introduced in (3) is of the form
Since the model we are considering, besides permutation invariance, is invariant by the sign change of the state vector, it follows that 1, µ) ; from the HJB systems (3) we derive the following closed equation for V N :
2 . From the unique solution of this system of equations we obtain the unique Nash equilibrium, given by the feedback strategy
We now set
The following result, that will be useful later, shows that if the representative player agrees with the majority, i.e. 
Proof. We prove (24) , the proof of (25) is similar. Note that Z N ( 1 2 ) = 0, so that it is enough to prove the claim for µ ≥
and
Note that, for µ >
We complete the proof by showing that s = −∞. (26) and (27) 
Since the control zero is suboptimal, it follows that |V N (t, ν)| ≤ 1 for all t, ν, so that
which is strictly positive for all times. In particular
that implies that also W N (s, µ) > 0; by continuity in time, this contradicts the definition of s.
Convergence of the value functions.
We now consider the value function V N , the unique solution to equation (22), and study its limit as N → +∞. We show that its limit corresponds to the entropy solution of the Master Equation (12) . More precisely, let U be the solution to (12) corresponding to the entropy solution Z of (13). Define, for
2 , but it is smooth elsewhere. Next result establishes that V N converges to U * uniformly outside any neighborhood of µ = 
Theorem 8 (Convergence of value functions). For any
where Cε does not depend on N nor on t, µ, but lim ε→0 C ε = +∞.
The proof of Theorem 8 is based on the arguments developed in [11] . We first slightly extend the above notation, letting, for x ∈ {−1, 1} N,i (t, x) , while the second shows that U * restricted to S ε N is "almost" a solution of (22) . Proposition 9. For any t ∈ [0, T ], ε > 0 and any x such that µ 
, where C ε is as above. We now use the information provided by Theorem 7. Set
Denote by Y s the state at time s of the N + 1 players corresponding to the Nash equilibrium. By Theorem 7 it follows that, if
In particular, by using the invariance property (21), we obtain
for every s ∈ [t, T ], almost surely, and
Moreover, we note that
Proof of Theorem 8. We choose a deterministic initial condition Y t ∈ Σ ε N , at time t ∈ [0, T ). As in the proof of Theorem 3 in [11] , we exploit the characterization, introduced in [10] , of the N -player dynamics in terms of SDEs driven by Poisson random measures, and we apply Ito's formula to the squared difference between the functions u N,i t and v N,i t , both computed in the optimal trajectories (Y s ) s∈ [t,T ] 1 . Using equations (31) and (22), we then find
where α i is the Nash equilibrium played by player i, α i is the control induced by U and all the functions are evaluated on the optimal trajectories, e.g.
We raise all the positive sum on the lhs and estimate the rhs using the Lipschitz properties of H, the bounds on r N and ∆ j u i given by Proposition 9, and the bound on α j given by the fact that
which can be further estimated via the convexity inequality ab ≤
Here C denotes any constant which may depend on ε, and is allowed to change from line to line. Since all the functions are evaluated on the optimal trajectories, we apply (33) and (35) to obtain
1 We remark that in [10] , indeed, the controls (transition rates) are assumed to be bounded below away from zero. Nevertheless, this fact is not used to derive the analogous identity to (36). A proof of the convergence results with no lower bound on the controls can be found in Section 3.1 of [9] , if the master equation possesses a classical solution.
for any deterministic initial condition Y t ∈ Σ ε N . Therefore (34) gives
and thus Gronwall's lemma applied to the quantity max µ∈S ε
which immediately implies (29), but only if N ≥ 2 ε . Changing the value of C = C ε , the thesis follows for any N . 
where C µ 0 does not depend on N , and lim µ 0 → 1 2
Denote by X i (t) the dynamics of the i-th player when choosing the control
induced by the master equation. We use X t as an intermediate process for obtaining the propagation of chaos result. In fact, X t can be treated as a mean field interacting system of particles (since the rate in (40) does not depend on N ), for which propagation of chaos results are more standard. Next result shows the proximity of the optimal dynamics to the intermediate process just introduced. 
Proof. Let µ 0 = 1 2 + 2ε and consider the set A where both X t and Y t belong to Σ ε N , for any time. Exploting the probabilistic representation of the dynamics in terms of Poisson random measures (see [10] ), we have
and now we apply (29), the Lipschitz continuity of U in Σ ε N and the exchangeability of the processes to get, if N ≥
We can bound the probability of A C by considering the process in which the transition rates are equal to 0, for any time, i.e. the constant process equal to the initial condition ξ. Thanks to the shape of the Nash equilibrium, which prevents the dynamics from crossing the discontinuity, and of the control induced by the solution to the Master equation, we have
. For the latter, we have
, and observing that (N + 1)µ N ξ ∼ Bin(N + 1, 1 2 + 2ε), we can further estimate, by standard Markov inequality,
Putting estimate (46) into (43), and denoting ϕ(t) := E sup s∈ [0,t] 
which, by Gronwall's lemma, gives (41), but only if N ≥ 2 ε . By changing the value of C = C ε , the claim follows for any N .
We are now in the position to prove Theorem 11. Thanks to (41), it is enough to show that
Recall that the X i 's are i.i.d and Law( X i (t)) = m * (t); also, set m = m * and µ = m+1 2 . The rate of convergence follows from the estimate 
We can bound the probability of A C as before and thus Gronwall's Lemma allows to conclude.
3.6. Potential mean field game. We give here another characterization of the solutions to the MFG system (7). For a more detailed introduction on potential mean field games in the finite state space see [9] , Section 1.4.1. We show that system (7) can be viewed as the optimality necessary conditions, given by the Pontryagin maximum principle, of a deterministic optimal control problem in R 2 . We show that the N -player game selects exactly the minimum of this problem when it is unique, i.e. when m 0 = 0. The notation are slightly different in this section. Consider the controlled dynamics, representing the KFP equation, 
Conclusions
Let us summarize the main results we have obtained for this two state model with anti-monotonous terminal cost:
(1) the mean field game possesses exactly 3 solutions, if T > 2 (Proposition 2); (2) the N -player value functions converge to the entropy solution to the master equation (Theorem 8); (3) the N -player optimal trajectories converge to one mean field game solution, if m 0 = 0 (Theorem 11); (4) viewing the mean field game system as the necessary conditions for optimality of a deterministic control problem, the N -player game selects the optimum of this problem, when it is unique, i.e. m 0 = 0 (Theorem 15). We remark that in the convergence proof we did not make use of the characterization of the right solution to the master equation as the entropy admissible one; the key point is to show that the N -player optimal trajectories do not cross the discontinuity. Neither did we use the potential structure of the problem: these are properties which might allow to extend the convergence results to more general models.
Observe that solutions of the MFG system, whether selected by the limit of N -player Nash equilibria or not, always yield approximate Nash equilibria in decentralized symmetric feedback strategies; see, for instance, [2] and [10] in the finite state setting.
What is left to prove for this model is a propagation of chaos result when m 0 = 0. Let m + , resp. m − , be the mean field game solution always positive, resp. always negative. What is evident from the simulations is that the N -player optimal trajectories admit a limit which is not deterministic: it is supported is m + and m − with probability 1/2. We also observe that m + and m − are both minima of the deterministic optimal control problem related to the potential structure. An analogous result is rigorously obtained in [16] in the diffusion setting, where the focus is on starting the dynamics at the discontinuity of the unique entropy solution to the master equation.
